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THE UNWRITTEN, AND IRRATIONAL, CONSTITUTION OF REGULATORY GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES"
For some years now, we have been embarked in -this
country upon various programs for improving the administration of justice. In the field of administrative law, a
series of improvements have been initiated with the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act. That statute was
indeed but the beginning of a number of steps designed to
improve and publicize the actual mechanics of administrative justice and judicial review.
Those matters are of the highest importance, and it is
essential that the legal profession carry them forward to
intelligent conclusion. But now is also the time to probe
deeper into the general problem of regulatory government.
We must do that, lest we become deluded into thinking
that what we have done, or are now doing, marks the end
of the road to which there is, in truth, no end. As a matter
of fact, what we have done so far is to get the by-laws in
order, as it were. I propose that we now also begin to
look into the unwritten, and irrational, constitution of regulatory government.
We Americans rightly cherish our written constitutions,
state and national. They embody what Rufus Choate called
"the glittering and sounding generalities of natural right."
They fix for us certain ideals respecting government and
justice. But they leave much unsaid, particularly with
respect to new governmental ventures which our times have
forced upon us. What is thus left unsaid may be properly
regarded in its fundamentals as our own unwritten constitution, and that is the topic of this discussion.
I Originally delivered as an address before the Section of Administrative Law
of the 71st four-day meeting of the American Bar Association at Seattle on
September 7, 1948.
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In basic matters of governmental organization and operation, we have been careless architects. We have added,
trimmed, and remodeled, without much thought or design.
So far as we have reflected upon these broad aspects of
government at all, we have only nibbled at the subject, or
we have left it to the schoolmen. In the realm of practical
affairs many of us have been misled by Alexander Pope's
famous couplet:
For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administev'd is best.
Misled, I respectfully submit, because even good administration cannot surmount a governmental framework which
is irrational to the point of being unworkable. Modern
government is too large for mere good will, expertness, and
vision of the individual administrator to overcome the drag
of size and complexity. There are not enough saints, demigods, or heroes to staff today's machine of state.
To illustrate on a small scale both what I have in mind
and what might be done about it, I should like to center
this discussion about three examples. They are more than
examples. Put together for purposes of contrast, they demonstrate the nature of our problem. Take, if you will, the
idea that there should be a division of functions and labors
in government. Division of functions is more than an idea,
for it is as necessary in government as in a great factory
or organized scientific enterprise. In government I have one
example for you in which there is not enough division,
another in which there is too much, and a third in which
we think there is a fundamental division but it is dissolving
without our appearing to know about it.
I.
Lawyers are quite familiar with the idea that there should
be a division of functions between the prosecutor and the
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judge. We take that division for granted in our courts, but
often find it lacking in administrative tribunals which exercise judicial powers. So much has been said on the theoretical aspects of that situation that I shall not dwell upon it
here. But I do wish to touch briefly upon that aspect of
the same situation which bears upon governmental efficiency
and the best utilization of governmental manpower.
Most of you are familiar with the well-known report of
the so-called Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Its members differed on the theoretical
aspects of the division of prosecuting and judicial functions.
But there was no difference of opinion on the practical
aspects of the subject. The committee found that, without
any reason whatever, the heads of important federal agencies
were spending their time selecting employees, passing on
expense accounts, approving routine matters, and attempting to clear the entire business of a far-flung organization
and its thousands of operatives.
As a matter of fact, the situation is not as simple as that.
The so-called "independent" agencies or commissions-that
is, those which are not in any department headed by a
cabinet officer or equivalent-are prone to spend too much
time on such managerial and routine functions. But in departmental agencies something more than the reverse obtains, in which subordinates perform all functions and the
head of the agency tends to become little more than an
authenticating official. In the language of the day, decisions
are necessarily "institutional decisions" rather than the conclusions of the officer named by statute to make the ultimate
decision.
Such a situation in either instance is not merely poor
business but poor justice. The agency head who is overwhelmed with routine necessarily has little time for study
and reflection upon important questions of fact and law
involved in specific cases. The assembly line brings all mat-
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ters to the top, and in that process all becomes routine,
except that in the Federal Government they are called
"channels" rather than assembly lines. In this state of
affairs we are entitled to ask ourselves the question put by
Disraeli, "A government of statesmen or clerks?" We have
the latter in our regulatory agencies all too often and we
know it.
This situation exists because we have allowed regulatory
government to deteriorate into that kind of a machine. We
have done it so long that it has become accepted, and is at
least dangerously near becoming a part of our unwritten
constitution. Ten years ago the President of the United
States, upon receiving the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, put the matter
squarely up to the Congress. Nothing was done about it,
although the problem has been since recognized to the extent
of temporizing about it in connection with a few specific
administrative agencies.
II.
The example I have just stated concerns the lack of division of labors within a single agency. Now let us look at a
situation in which there is an unreasonable duplication or
multiplication of functions by several agencies dealing with
the same subject matter. A simple example is the regulation of advertising in connection with drug store preparations. Three agencies have jurisdiction. The Federal Trade
Commission has statutory authority over unfair and misleading advertising where interstate commerce or the mails
are concerned, the Post Office duplicates that authorit
where the mails are concerned, and the Food and Drug
Administration covers the whole field again so far as the
labels or accompanying literature are concerned.
There is, of course, either no difference, or no rational
difference, between the jurisdiction of these several federal
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regulatory agencies. If one believes in regulation for the
sake of regulation, or for purposes of oppression, there may
be no objection to this multiplicity of authority. But from
the standpoint of both governmental efficiency and fair regulation, such duplication is indefensible.
On the score of inefficiency, we thus have three sets of
investigators, three sets of public prosecutors, three sets of
field officies, three sets of rules and regulations, three sets
of files, three budgets, three appropriation acts, and so on.
Also, where more than one agency has its finger in the regulatory pie, there are inevitable jurisdictional squabbles which
cost time and money. In the rivalry between agencies, public
policy and public good are likely to come off second best.
On the score of simple justice, the situation becomes even
worse confounded. It would be bad enough if the distributor
of a product were subject to regulation by three agencies
instead of one. But he is also likely to find himself the
object of a race in which public officials see who can get
to him first, or who can make the more extravagant charges,
or who can demand the more drastic punishment. In this
respect, the example I have given is peculiarly oppressive
because, while the Federal Trade Commission and the Post
Office may institute but one administrative proceeding at a
time against any named respondent, the Food and Drug Administration merely works up the cases and then causes the
United States Attorneys to institute multiple libel proceedings in the several judicial districts. A small business, of
course, is completely defenseless against any such onslaught.
And the cure for this irrational situation is as simple as
the present jurisdiction is complex. The Federal Trade Commission properly exercises jurisdiction over false or misleading advertising, but the Post Office Department should have
no other function than to call the attention of the Federal
Trade Commission to such advertising found in the mails.
The Food and Drug Administration, as an organization with
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laboratory facilities, should be confined to the scientific
identification of drugs and the seizure of such as it may find
dangerous to life or health. If that were done, public money
would be conserved, justice would be served, and governmental energies could be directed to other things which wait
to be done.
In.
Now let us turn to a third, and even more far-reaching,
example. Our first example, as you will recall, dealt with
the failure to divide labors within a single agency. The
second dealt with repetitive functions by several agencies
respecting the same subject matter. I now desire to direct
your attention to the supposedly secure division of functions
between the Federal Government and the states.
We are accustomed to assume that the states and local
governments have a fixed sphere in which they remain
supreme. We are also accustomed to think that the same
is true of the Federal Government, with but occasional adjustment when the Congress and the Supreme Court enlarge
the scope of federal activities. In short, we conceive our
federal system as a grand division of governmental responsibilities given us by the Founding Fathers and perpetuated
by our written Constitution. But the situation is not as
simple as that, and our unwritten constitution silently day
by day wears away the realm supposedly left to the states.
For years the Supreme Court has been holding that, because similar powers have been conferred upon some federal
agency, this or that function of state or local governments
has by the very silence of the Congress been impliedly rendered null and void. Now, that federal functions have grown
with the expanded scope of the commerce clause, blind
legislation of that kind must ultimately come close to obliterating effective state or local government. The very fact that
in recent years it has been established that almost every
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serious activity of the people of this land may be the subject
of federal regulation, and that in the same time much has
been brought into federal control that previously had not
been, requires two things:
First, there is need for us to look back over legislation
of this generation and make due provision that it shall not
supersede state regulation where the latter does the job.
An attempt to accomplish this is contained in my bill, S. 1159,
of the Eightieth Congress, in which it is proposed that,
Except that nothing herein shall prevent agency action
necessary to protect public health and safety or to -remove
substantial discriminations against actual interstate or foreign commerce, no agency shall have jurisdiction to act in
any case to the extent that... a state or its duly empowered
authorities, instrumentalities, or subdivisions have undertaken
active regulation of the same subject to a similar purpose or
effect.
Second, when new or expanded authority is proposed
for any federal agency, members of Congress should ask
themselves: "If this is done, will and should all state and
local jurisdiction to the same effect automatically cease to
be valid?"
The first of those things has not been done, the second
rarely. As a result, our unwritten constitution now in effect
provides that, every time we add federal regulatory authority, by the same token and without saying so we diminish
the authority of all the states. In many, perhaps most, such
situations, that result is unnecessary and may be unwise.
In any event, whether or not necessary or wise, that effect
comes about silently and thoughtlessly. Thus, moreover,
have we blindly ignored Thomas Jefferson's admonition that
state governments are "the most competent administrations
for our domestic concerns, and the surest bulwarks" against
anti-democratic tendencies.
IV.
In conclusion, I should like to remind you that my three
examples are only examples. There are too many more
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which might be cited, and there are undoubtedly better ones.
But these should serve to illustrate the unwritten and
irrational nature of our present form of regulatory government. I hope they also illustrate that the situation is not
hopeless but merely waits diligent and intelligent treatment.
In that effort, which I pray will be forthcoming, the bar
should play an important part.
The legal profession n:ay not have thought about these
things, or may have thought about them in different terms.
But surely lawyers' daily work has brought them in contact
with the subject. And lawyers, who have not only felt these
things but are members of the profession which deals with
laws and governments in a free society, are the natural
source for suggestions and aid in devising remedies.
I can conceive of no more important service on the part
of the legal profession. Law, and government under law, is
under attack in most parts of this world. Whether the idea
of law and government to which we all subscribe will survive
must depend on us. It will not suffice for us merely to have
laws or to have a government. It wili not suffice for us
merely to hold the line. Our laws and our government must
be made adequate to the challenge of this revolutionary age,
just as our written Constitution so well met the challenge of
an earlier day. The legal profession is more than the custodian of our legal institutions. It is the guardian and
trustee, charged with something more than complacently
sitting by while our heritage is undermined and our trust
dissipated.
Pat McCaran.

